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Introduction
Uncertainties over the concept and systematic application of 
fundamental rights (in private law)
Horizontalization of fundamental/human rights, or 
Constitutionalization of private law, is a process received in widely 
varying ways in the European legal environment. 
On one hand, there is the entrance of fundamental/human rights 
into a space previously exclusive to private law and its institutional 
protection provided by ordinary courts, perceived as a process having 
its own natural course, logic, apparent dimensions and ties to the 
system in which it is applied, and particularly its own aims. If certain 
attributes of this process are subjected to criticism or doubts, according 
to this part of opinions, it concerns aspects that are rather marginal, not 
doubting the fundamental dimensions of this process and its implacable 
logic of implementation. 
On the other hand, a group of important authors expresses 
fundamental doubts regarding this process in wide measure, beginning 
with the basic essence and nature of fundamental rights and continuing 
to the specific correlation of application of fundamental rights in 
private law. An elementary barrier to the precision of research in this 
area is its terminological side: terms such as “principles”, “values”, 
“human rights”, “constitutional rights” or “fundamental rights” are 
mainly used in juridical literature and commentaries, but also in case 
law, interchangeability, often lacking effort to make their content and 
scope more precise. One key contradiction is seen in the very nature 
of fundamental rights and in sources from which they are derived. 
A question to resolve here is whether fundamental rights are an 
expression of freedom, or whether their existence is conditional to their 
formulation or even publication. Also in the question of the reach of 
horizontalization of fundamental rights, consensus was not achieved 
and the existence of various models, reaching from direct effect, through 
strong indirect effect all the way to weak indirect effect are a reality that 
must be taken into account upon studying this area. Also differing is 
the content or scope of the term fundamental rights, amongst which 
there is no unity on incorporating social rights (Micklitz), or solidarity 
(Sefton-Green) into their group.
Today, it rather seems that those in the majority are proponents 
of the first trend supporting the course and stipulated aims of 
horizontalization of fundamental rights or constitutionalization 
of private law. This process is furnished by multiple sources, 
amongst which the European Court of Justice (ECJ), representing 
an institutional and functional tool of creation and Europeization 
of common European principles, plays a key role; today however, 
in its structure and competencies, ECJ activities focus on subduing 
the private and public element in its decision-making activity. 
While EU law is primarily focused on the area of public law, the ECJ 
works practically not only with sources of private law, but also with 
constitutional principles. This source was augmented legislatively 
and its content greatly expanded after adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, 
i.e., since 2009. The Lisbon Treaty established the legal status of 
the Nice Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union and 
made it binding for those EU institutions and for Member States 
having implemented EU law. On the other hand, it is certainly 
necessary to mention the provisions of the Treaty on European 
Union, such as Article 6(1) or the Declaration attached to the Treaty, 
ruling out direct binding force of the Charter.  The binding force 
of European principles is applied generally by applying secondary law, 
i.e., EU directives, national courts or by interpretation of the content 
of directives in the intentions of fundamental rights contained in the 
Charter.
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Abstract
This paper focuses on the consequences of a situation having evolved from a process ongoing at both the level of 
the European Union and the individual national level of EU Member States, generally known as constitutionalization 
of private law, or as the horizontal effect of fundamental rights arising from international, European and national 
constitutional provisions on human rights, in the specific conditions of the Czech Republic. Czech lawmakers introduced 
references and even partially adopted into the text of the Civil Code fundamental/human rights, by which it bared the 
yet rather latent question of mutual definition and mutual relationship of fundamental constitutional rights and private 
law principles. Assessing this relationship and its impacts forms the core of this paper. In conclusion, the author offers 
a proposal for resolving systemic discrepancy of the effect of human rights in the conditions of private law.
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In the action of both sources (ECJ and the Charter), a synergistic 
effect is seen, where the ECJ applies the Charter as one of the sources 
when defining general legal principles. According to H Collins, the 
current horizontal effect of fundamental rights and principles of the 
EU is applied correctly by means of inserting an obligation to a national 
court, in the case of relevance of a fundamental right or fundamental 
principle to the cause of performing interpretation of national law in a 
manner most conforming to EU law.
Another source of implementing European standards, values and 
principles founded thereupon, including fundamental rights, upon 
which the value and legal system of the EU is built, albeit non-binding, 
but very influential in fact according to the first signs, is comprised of 
European private law projects, leading towards unification of individual 
areas of private law of Member States with the prospects of a future 
unified European civil code. In light of their exceptional meaning for 
national legal systems, including their constitutionalization, separate 
attention will be paid to the most important of them – the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (“DCFR”) [1-6].
Application of fundamental rights in European private law 
projects
The process of constitutionalization of fundamental rights is, 
as stated above, fed from multiple sources, which are the texts of 
international acts on human rights and activity of European judicial 
institutions. The course of constitutionalization of private law took on 
a new dimension in discussions during preparation and elaboration 
and in the work results of the Study Group for a European Civil Code. 
The Draft Common Frame of Reference became a training ground in 
which, on a (quasi) legislative level, rules and values of “classic” private 
law, limited to the area of contractual law, clashed with constitutional 
fundamental rights and beckoned attention in terms of their mutual 
coherency or rather compatibility. At the same time, the DCFR 
provided a practical example of the difficulty with which the process 
of constitutionalization of private law encounters in reality. One may 
certainly agree in general with the concept of constitutionalization of 
private law as a prerequisite for reflecting fundamental constitutional 
principles and fundamental rights in all branches of law, including 
private law. It is harder however to agree with the concept, in which the 
primacy of private law over public law or fundamental rights, is based 
on the concept of private law as detailed articulation of constitutional 
rights. This approach has both a genetic and methodological deficit. 
Fundamental rights are projected into private law ex post, with a delay; 
this creates substantially complicated possibilities for truly systemic 
and coherent solutions of this symbiosis. An example is the first wave 
of “socialization” of private law, which took place in European legal 
systems in the latter half of the 19th century and turn of the 20th 
century and left consequences on the form of legal systems that are 
conceptually and systemically comparable to implementation of the 
praetorian finding of law with its key instrument in the form of equity 
in Roman law of the classical period.  
The DCFR, though explicitly, indeed primarily inherent in its 
name, designated as a group of principles, lists fundamental principles 
or values in its introduction and not in the text itself. However, the 
introduction neither introduces nor states fundamental-constitutional 
laws, but rather a foursome of values typical for private law and its values 
and in formulation in a likeness corresponding to the methodology 
of private law (freedom, security, justice and efficiency). At the same 
time, it justifies it is not including amongst these principles/values 
solidarity and social responsibility, in that working with them (thus the 
method) is a matter not for private but for public law. There is special 
meaning in the approach of the DCFR creators towards systematic 
classification of human rights amongst those values of which DCFR 
is comprised. Human rights are not classified amongst principles and 
values underlying model rules, because they do not belong amongst 
underlying principles, but rather amongst overriding principles.
In the text of the DCFR, fundamental rights are not explicitly 
named, but are referred to methodically in Article I-1:102.
With regard to the aforementioned specification of the functional 
status of values and fundamental rights towards model rules contained 
in the DCFR, it is appropriate to interpret the mentioned article 
differently: According to the interpretive rule in Para. (1), it is necessary 
to interpret and develop them separately and in accordance with their 
purpose and principles underlying them. Relating Para. (2) stipulates 
reading the model rules of DCFR in the light of any applicable 
instruments guaranteeing human rights and fundamental freedoms 
and any applicable constitutional laws.
The apparent discrepancy of both paragraphs of the mentioned 
provision can be removed, if we:
a. start from the autonomy of model rules;
b. which is broken by the second part of the text of the first 
paragraph, i.e., in accordance with the aims of model rules and 
with principles underlying them (thus with inherent principles 
towards private law);
c. read the rules of DCFR in the light of any applicable instruments 
guaranteeing human rights and fundamental freedoms and any 
applicable constitutional laws.
The creators of DCFR thus started out by respecting the differences 
in private law principles and fundamental constitutional rights, they 
distinguish their private and public nature and subject them to a 
differing method of application and interpretation. But what the creators 
of DCFR did not take into account is the difference in the notion of 
fundamental subjective rights, which by their nature are primarily 
public and the notion of freedom, which is the foundation and starting 
point mainly of private regulation. Both categories meanwhile differ 
not only in external features, but also in the content and relation to 
private law, which are immediate and primary for freedom, which does 
not apply to the majority of fundamental subjective rights. This paper 
starts from this partial conclusion in further considerations on the 
possibilities of resolving the barriers of permeation of both categories.
From an overview of the aforementioned opinions, H Collins 
makes a partial summary of the conclusions on the systematic 
and functional context: (a) Upon thorough respect for traditional 
differentiation of private and public law, sources arising from 
both fundamental branches of law are difficult to interconnect 
systematically and private law is not sufficiently prepared to accept 
fundamental constitutional rights and principles into its system. (b) 
On the contrary, acceptance of the concept of a single structure of 
sources of law leads to inclusion of basic constitutional rights and 
principles into a single internally unified system of law, including 
both public and private law.
The mentioned approaches have significant meaning for 
permeability of the constitutionalization process:  
It seems that amongst lawyers, preferences are shown for a 
somewhat simplified and less sophisticated approach founded upon 
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a unified structure of sources of law and overcoming the boundaries 
between private and public law. 
It is the author’s opinion however; the boundary between private 
and public law cannot be overcome simply by sheer will power without 
deeper argumentation. More thorough and broader argumentation 
enables us to find ways for further implementation of fundamental 
(constitutional) rights into private law while respecting the basic 
structure of the legal system.  Upon standard, or perhaps traditional 
respect for the differences in the subject and method of private and 
public regulation and differentiation of private law principles from 
fundamental constitutional rights and principles, we see that the 
fundamental private law principles act in the intentions of the method 
of private regulation, expressed by an algorithm of fundamental 
values of freedom – equality – balance (equity, justice). As opposed 
to this, fundamental constitutional rights preserve their genetically 
public nature. This difference however is less axiological and more 
methodological and functional. This creates room for bringing 
both groups closer, because their common value basis facilitates 
concentration on methodological approaches (see proposals for 
resolution in points IV-V of this paper).
Legislative approach/activism of Czech lawmakers
Czech lawmakers – using opportunities of ongoing complex re-
codification of private law in the Czech Republic – projected into the 
actual text of the new Civil Code its link to constitutional sources, by 
which they were implicitly and indirectly incorporated into the text 
of the Civil Code. This then opened a chapter of distinctly conceived 
questions for resolving contact and possible mutual merging of 
yet internal values, upon which private law is built, with effect of 
fundamental/human rights derived from constitutional sources.  
In the text of the new Civil Code, Czech lawmakers attempted to 
respect – of course not at all identical legislatively and technically with 
the text of DCFR – the differences of constitutional-public and “private” 
sources.
The specific likeness and simultaneously specifics of the Czech 
approach to Constitutionalization of private law can be summarized as 
follows:
(a) Especially in their introductory provisions of Sec 1 (1), Czech 
lawmakers - in terms of current approaches - incorporated the 
largely disputable sentence: “The application of private law is 
independent of the application of public law.” By this provision, 
in its purpose enshrined in the first half of the 19th century, 
the lawmakers reinvigorated the complex discussion amongst 
Czech lawyers, upon which, under its influence, will be difficult 
to overcome boundaries of private and public law and not only 
that which could be a barrier to implementing the influence of 
constitutional principles in the branch of private law.
(b) Expressed in one of the introductory provisions of the Civil 
Code is a requirement for a constitutionally conforming 
interpretation of the provisions of the Civil Code. Fundamental 
(constitutional) rights are not explicitly mentioned in the text, 
but are considered a part of constitutional order of the CR, 
including contracts on human rights, by which the CR is bound.
(c) In one breath, in the same provision, the requirement is 
included for interpretation of the provisions of private law 
“with the principles by which this act is comprised, also with 
permanent regard to values protected thereby.” Thus, the Civil 
Code exercised - as opposed to the DCFR – the same methodical 
procedure upon interpreting fundamental (constitutional) 
rights and principles contained in private law, by which it 
established systematically and methodically the contradictory 
handling of public and private sources.
(d) In the relating provisions of Sec 3, the Civil Code now enshrines 
as a source of private law a group “of underlying principles” 
(Civil Code – J.H.); it thus performs a work explicitly, a 
demonstrative enumeration, a work by declaring that “Private 
law flows also from further generally recognized principles of 
justice and law.”
(e) The Civil Code recognizes a different role for fundamental 
(constitutional) rights and private law principles when applying 
the law: The Civil Code requires explicitly, if the legal case 
cannot be decided upon even while using an explicit rule or by 
analogie legis, it’s judging “according to the principles of justice 
and principles underlying this Act.” 
In the new Civil Code, Czech lawmakers neither capitalized on 
the opportunity nor addressed the appeals in the area of applying 
fundamental (constitutional) rights in private law, formulated by both 
the academic discussion, running in parallel with preparation of the 
Civil Code and by its outcomes, as expressed legislatively inter alias in 
DCFR. This updated the requirement in the Czech Republic to search 
for - legislative, but mainly interpretive - solutions to problems affiliated 
with further constitutionalization of private law and simultaneously, 
by its legislative solution, hindered opportunities to achieve a viable 
solution.
Possible approaches to a solution in wider, particularly 
process-related genetic correlations
The situation arising by the “meeting” of fundamental (human, 
constitutional) rights in process constitutionalization of private law 
with principles contained in private law, thus with starting points 
forming the value-related functioning of private law, indicate differing 
starting points upon which private law values and fundamental 
(human, constitutional) rights are built. While on one hand, the basis 
of private law in the period of modernity is freedom of the individual, 
preceding the law and the aim of regulation is in part to protect this 
value preceding the law and in part to limit it in the interest of another 
value of private law, which is equality of entities and achieving balance 
of participating interests of persons, on the other hand, fundamental 
rights are built upon active recognition to a person of subjective rights, 
originally leading towards public power.
These differing starting points point out the paradigmatic and 
functional/systemic incompatibility of the group of fundamental rights 
with the paradigm of private law. Léon Duguit has already pointed out 
this somewhat latent discrepancy, as did Jaromír Sedláček in older Czech 
juridical literature. They questioned the position of subjective rights in 
the system of private law regulation as fundamental modality of law and 
stressed the importance of subjective responsibility. As opposed to this, 
by their nature, fundamental rights may in private relations only either 
support fundamental, primary and simultaneously value preceding the 
law, which law itself does not create, but rather protects it, or limits 
in the interest of other persons or in the common interest, human 
freedom, or may support equality of participants, or their balanced 
position of entities with each other. Their effect in horizontal – private 
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relations is thus: (a) partial – sketchy, because from the algorithm of 
finding the balance of participants in a system regulated by private law, 
they only focus on the partial aspect of fundamental private value as a 
whole, thereby less on the algorithm of fundamental private law values 
(freedom-equality-justice); (b) inconsistent with the methodology of 
private law regulation in a modern society; (c) institutionally incoherent, 
because their key institution is subjective right as, to a certain extent, a 
foreign element in fundamental institutional construction of private 
law; (d) systemically dysfunctional, because it contributes to the 
questioning of the boundaries between private and public law.
This status has its own logic lying in its historic origin: A 
group of fundamental rights (typically Bill of Rights), arising first in 
the womb of the feudal system, founded upon the legal status of the 
individual created actively, by recognition or acquisition of privileges 
by specific persons within a specific scope. The resulting concept of 
modernity partially retained the original concept of subjective rights, 
in fundamental measure and was paradigmatically replaced by a trio 
of values contained in modern society: freedom-equality-fraternity. 
The new axiological starting points were thus not accompanied by an 
adequate institutional change.
The dilemma of the historical determinate aspect of fundamental 
rights was not therefore resolved by establishment of a society founded 
upon freedom, equality and solidarity and was transferred into a system 
of modernity as a paradigmatic solution. In the altered conditions 
however, they can be considered at the most a complementary, 
supporting system.
An example of discrepancy, which had to be resolved upon 
transition to a new bourgeois society, is the teaching of John Locke, 
whose work Theory of Value and Property (1690) became the bible of 
bourgeois society, Locke started from two key values that he considered 
being (a) man himself and (b) the work he himself creates. From this 
basis, a dilemma was derived, resting in the double concept of man 
and property in relation to the conceptual basis of a dissolving society 
and a new society: (a) on one hand, as a pair of entirely elementary 
fundamental rights, i.e., man towards himself and towards the work 
he creates, thus his property; (b) on the other hand, as a fundamental 
form of freedom of a person (personal freedom and property freedom). 
Impacts of this dichotomous concept of a person and a person’s property 
are present still today in the fundamental conceptual starting points of 
(private) regulation.
Conclusions
Constitutionalization of private law is linked to a series of 
accompanying phenomena, of which some are parametric, but others 
are paradigmatic, in nature. Regarding the latter of the two, it applies 
that the process of the entrance of fundamental rights into private 
law is one of the factors blurring the differences between private and 
public law of course, this also means overcoming the methodology 
of private and public regulation, which forms the basis for difference 
between both basic branches of law and the thus influenced likeness of 
values rising in the form of fundamental rights and values traditionally 
belonging to private law. One of the directions of constitutionalization 
of private law thus concerns the path towards removing barriers 
between private and public law; the second direction (supported also 
by this paper’s author) is in this aspect significantly more reserved, 
and seeks to promote inroads towards constitutionalization of private 
law through alternative solutions. Upon respecting the tendency to 
preserve the dichotomy of private and public law, the differing form of 
values, upon which they are built and their differing methodology, it 
would be worthwhile to consider whether or not values, whose bearers 
are fundamental/constitutional law, upon their entrance into private 
relations in their horizontal form (i.e., between the bearer of a free 
position, existing prior the law and other private values) change their 
legal nature in accordance with the private methodology and private 
expression of values.
The last-mentioned solution holds systemic value: on one hand, 
it enables implementation of the process of constitutionalization of 
private law in its forms found in reality and functionality of private 
law and systemic categorization of values, principles, methodology 
and institutional instruments of private law and on the other hand, 
it preserves the fundamental structure of law and the structural and 
functional coherency of its fundamental branches. In  this sense, it 
may represent a possible solution to the problem of integrity and 
cohesiveness of the doctrinal system of law, as pointed out by Collins 
[7-13].
References
1. Micklitz HW (2011) The Many Concepts of Social Justice in European Private 
Law. (edn.). Cheltenham, UK – Northampton, USA: Edward Elgar: 3-156.
2. Alpa G (2013) Competition of Legal Systems and Harmonization of European 
Private Law. Munich: sellier European law publishers GmbH 3: 40-48.
3. Cassese A (2009) I diritti umani oggi, Roma-Bar 91.
4. Collins CF (2011) The Constitutionalization of European Private Law. (edn.). 
The Many Concepts of Social Justice in European Private Law Cheltenham, 
UK – Northampton, USA: Edward Elgar: 3-156.
5.  See the Nice Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2007).
6. Von Bar CH, Clive E (2009) Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of 
European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) Oxford 
University Press.
7. Cherednychenko O (2004) The Constitutionalization of Contract Law: 
Something new under the Sun?  Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 8 1:1-6.
8. Friedmann D (2001) Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law (edn.). 
Human Rights in Private Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing 13.
9. Cherednychenko O (2007) Fundamental Rights and Private Law: A Relationship 
of Subordination or Complementarity? Utrecht Law Review 3:1-25.
10. Kumm M (2006) Who is afraid of the total Constitution? Constitutional Rights 
as Principles and the Constitutionalization of Private Law. German Law Journal 
7: 341-344.
11. Hurdík J, Lavický P (2011) Systém zásad soukromého práva- Review.
12. “Every provision of private law can be interpreted only in conformity with the 
Charter on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (forming a part of constitutional 
law of the CR – author’s note) and with constitutional order in general.”
13. Duguit L (1927) went even further, when he proposed replacing subjective law 
with the term “social function.” Traité de droit constitutionnel, Paris.
Citation: Hurdík J (2015) Two-Way Influencing of the Categories of 
Fundamental (Constitutional) Rights and Private Law Principles as the Result 
of Constitutionalization of Private Law in Light of the New Czech Civil Code. J 
Civil Legal Sci 4: 143. doi:10.4172/2169-0170.1000143
